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B5arr Laboratories $398.1 million in exchange adbadddu auatrr yalwn
for Barr's promise to refrain from marketinggeeimauctrstohlenehevidy
a generic version of Bayer's antimicrobial o rn aedu aet ihu nurn h
drug ciprofloxacin hydrochloride (Cipro) until cs fetyo ikn aae rmpsil
December 2003.1 At first appearance, a branded ifigmn
pharmaceutical company paying a generic UdrHthWxatefrtgnrcfr ofl
competitor to stay out of the market sounds a brvae e rgApiain(NA
exactly like the kind of anticompetitive practicewihFAasrngtttebad-mepei
that antitrust law is meant to prevent. However,isetrinadorotnfngdsettldoa
the issue becomes significantly more complicated"butwhcaloshetonerhemkl
when the payment is made as part of a patent- wt 8-a xlsvt eid fetvl
litigation settlement. Over the past several cetn upl ln ihtebadnm
decades, pharmaceutical companies that produce rvd.8Tiexlsitprodsaalbc
brand-name drugs have settled patent litigation by ol ne otefrtAD plcn. eas
making large payments (or providing something akysuc fpoisfragnrcmnfcue
else of value) to potential rivals in exchange i h xlsvt eid h onypoie
for the abandonment of suits that, if successful, sbtnilbott h netv ocalne1
would increase market competition. 2 As part ofInrsoetoheADhebaddfm
the settlement, the rival generic pharmaceutical myfl utt sals httegnrcdu
company typically agrees to stay off the market i nrnigo hi aet eas eei
for a period of time that may or may not cover
the life of the patent. These "pay-for-delay"ens adbane mnfctrn
settlements have been the subject of considerableofefaelssinteblosofdlrsf hi
controversy among certain agencies, courts, and ptn sfudt eulwui sotni h
commentators. 4ineetothbrnmauatrrostl.II
Although courts generally encourage settlement, Testlmn fteesisagal rae,
pay-for-delay settlements are unusual in that theanntrutvotinbcseheetlmi
plaintiff in the original suit (the patent holder) is
paying the defendant (the challenger claiming silalw h eei auatrrt no
patent invalidity) to end the suit.5 These reverse te10dyecuiiypro pnetrn
payment settlements are a byproduct of thethmaktusrovntebutyfmth
Hatch-Waxman Act, which was intended to allow tbe 2B eoigtebuttestlmn
generic drugs to enter the market with greater
ease and speed by letting them bypass clinicalgerismnfcurstchlnetebadd
trials if the generic drug could be shown to bepaetThogutheasdcdteFCha;
bioequivalent to the already approved brand- hl ees amn eteet ob nirs
name drug .6 The Hatch-Waxman Act was also voain o hsvr esn run htb
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